DEFINING CRITERIA FOR HANDOVER TO CIVILIAN OFFICIALS IN RELIEF OPERATIONS
On 18 April 1906, an earthquake of 8.3 Richter magnitude struck along the San Andreas Fault near the city of San Francisco. The fire that resulted from the tremors was devastating. In a city of 400,000 people, the combination of the earthquake and fire left 550 dead, but the true magnitude was manifested in the 220,000 homeless and the total loss of the city's commercial industrial center. Federal relief efforts included mobilization of National Guard assets, but despite the magnitude of this disaster, after six weeks, the Guardsmen were demobilized and sent home, having accomplished all missions required to the satisfaction of the state and local officials. The key milestones associated with this withdrawal included, but were not limited to, the restoration of utilities outside the burned area, the closure of the missing persons' bureau, debris removal completed from the downtown area, resumption of retail trade, and stabilization of food lines. 1 During this period, as in all disasters, normal social and economic activities ceased or were dramatically degraded: how long the emergency period lasts is generally a factor of the society's capacity to react and cope with a disaster. In the case of the San Francisco earthquake, the end of the emergency phase was characterized as when there was a generalized cessation of search and rescue, a restoration of law and order and feeling of security by the locals, a drastic reduction in emergency mass feeding and housing, and clearance of debris from principal arteries.
2
These milestones correlated with the National Guard's relief from responsibility to civilian authorities, and could well serve as an example for disengagement criteria that might be useful for the relief efforts underway today.
The United States Army conducts full spectrum operations to accomplish its missions in both war and in operations other than war. Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. 3 Field Manual (FM) 3-07 defines "support operations" as those generally conducted in response to emergencies (natural or manmade disasters), and to relieve or reduce suffering. Support operations meet the immediate needs of civil authorities or designated groups for a limited time until they are able to accomplish those tasks without military assistance. FM 3-07 goes on to describe two categories of support operations: those which support domestic support operations (DSO), and those which support foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), 4 which are those relief efforts in support of another nation. Disaster relief operations are further described as having three stages -response (roughly corresponding to the "emergency" phase described above), recovery, and restoration. The military's role is often most intense in the response stage, diminishing steadily as the operation moves into the recovery and restoration stages. Response operations normally focus on those life-sustaining functions required by the population in the disaster area. Recovery operations begin the process of returning the community infrastructure and the services to a status that satisfied the needs of the population. Military forces normally redeploy as operations transition from the response to the recovery stage. 5 It is fair to say that as populations and global temperatures continue to rise, there will be increased competition for resources and opportunities for friction between and among nations. This increased competition will often end in conflict (and the accompanying human suffering); global climate change will be responsible for an increasing number of natural disasters such as cyclones, hurricanes, and other natural disasters. Too often in these situations, the military forces of the United States are employed as they are often the most readily available, resourced, and capable entity which can alleviate suffering or offer aid. Fortunately, as the California earthquake vignette illustrates, the United States military has a long history of intervention into both disaster and humanitarian assistance as well assisting with post-conflict stability operations, with an accompanying abundance of doctrine to assist the planner and
commander.
But what is often missing is the exit strategy -defining the metrics needed to transition the relief effort from one of primarily military control back to civilian control. In the past, no aspect of post-conflict operations has been more problematic for American military forces. While it is widely agreed that civilian and international organizations must assume those missions initially addressed by an intervening military as soon as possible, 6 defining the handover criteria varies from crisis to crisis. Particularly in disaster relief operations, the military is often asked to stay longer than practicable because the host nation or the people they are assisting feel that the military provides the only sure sense of security, dependability, and safety in a very traumatic situation, and a sense of reassurance that civil organizations are unable to provide at that particular moment. This is especially challenging when the disaster is of such a magnitude that the civil police force is absent and normal law and order begins to break down. In these situations, the military may have to 'wean' the civilians from the military presence, 7 in order to enable the host government or civil authorities to reassert themselves as fully empowered. cooperating with these different groups may prove to be one of the military's greatest challenges, and yet they may well prove to be among the greatest enablers, depending on how the military engages them. Because it is the civilians to whom the military will eventually leave the recovery and reconstruction tasks for completion, it is imperative they are engaged at the earliest opportunity. forces may execute a transition plan. 9 Because these organizations are largely civilian agencies with less ability to mobilize rapidly, the military normally remains in place until these organizations have sufficient capacity to relieve the military of these duties. JP 3-08 provides an excellent checklist for planners to use when the need to coordinate with local, regional, national, and international NGOs arises. While it is not a list of discrete tasks, it is a good resource to guide planners and commanders in developing a list of transition tasks appropriate to the relief effort to which they are deployed.
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The Department of Defense must become better prepared to execute these missions, for it is clear that relief operations are here to stay. It is urgent that the military define a set of metrics by which to determine handover criteria from military to civilian control in these sorts of operations. To that end, this paper offers three models by which commanders can define their exit metrics. These three models are referred to as In doctrine, security is identified as an activity common to both types of relief operations.
14 Both domestically and overseas, providing a safe and secure environment for the local population as well as the relief workers is critical to success.
In this paper, it will become evident that before the military transitions out of sector, security is absolutely an essential element before true progress is made. In the case of DSO, DOD Directive 3025.12 contains guidance concerning the use of military assets during civil disturbances. Federal Army forces can be authorized to assist civil authorities restore law and order when the magnitude of the disturbance exceeds the capabilities of local and state law enforcement agencies, including the National Guard. 15 The Army helps civil authorities restore law and order when state and local law enforcement agencies cannot control civil disturbances.
In FHA, security is also a significant consideration. Whether the environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile will determine the amount of security forces applied. In a permissive environment, this may be nothing more than enough forces to prevent desperate populations from overrunning distribution points. The fact remains that there is a security aspect to both types of support operations, if only to allow civilian agencies to operate safely and uninhibited from either the population being helped on the one hand, or hostile forces on the other. 16 Exacerbating this is the dynamic that different sectors of a neighborhood, county, province or country will recover or transition at different rates. This means that the military cannot simply pull out in a single day, but must gradually contract its footprint and phase itself out; this too must be a part of the initial planning. This may not be a long process, as in the case of the Indonesian tsunami relief; on the other hand, it can often be quite a prolonged presence. An excellent illustration can be found in New
Orleans where, three years after Katrina, National Guard troops continue to bolster New
Orleans' hurricane-depleted police force, while the city and its police force have worked to bounce back from Hurricane Katrina and clamp down on violent crime. 17 Without security for both relief workers and citizens, the move from emergency to recovery cannot move forward.
The Dynamics of Intervention
Turning to termination criteria in doctrine, the importance of termination of operations is highlighted in JP 5-0 (Joint Operations Planning). JP 5-0 states that termination is discussed first among the elements of operational design because effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the end state and the conditions that must exist to end military operations. In order to do this, the Joint Force commander must define the conditions of the 'stabilize' and 'enable civil authority'
phases. 18 History is replete with examples of ill-defined conditions for 'stabilize,'
'turnover to civilian control,' or an end state that becomes a moving target -a situation the military colloquially describes as 'mission creep.'
A critical dynamic to bear in mind is that the deployment of ground forces into any region (at home or abroad) and the approach they take to the local population will immediately affect the population's daily life, perceptions, and politics -for better or worse, depending on the viewpoint of the inhabitants. 19 Ignoring this may have negative effects, not the least of which might be a loss of legitimacy -however temporary -of the local government in the eyes of the local populace. If the relief forces are viewed as able to provide more and better services, including the establishment of an environment relatively free from looting, vandalism, or crime, then one of the unintended consequences of the military's presence might very well be a growing reluctance on the part of the relief efforts' targeted population to return to their normal civil authorities during the recovery phase.
Another major challenge facing relief effort commanders is the relationship required between their headquarters and civilians responding to the disaster or crisis.
There are three groups of civilians in any relief effort: the populace being assisted;
NGOs and other private organizations, and the local, regional, and federal officials of the U.S. government and host nation. Technical and cultural differences aside, the civilian vision of the end state (and the tasks required to get there), may be vastly different than that of the military -even amongst themselves! Understanding the expectations and capabilities of all parties, is a critical element, and in fact affects all three transition models discussed in this paper. As JP 3-08 (Department of Defense, Interagency, Intergovernmental Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I) states, as the civilians will be engaged long after the military have pulled out, it is also essential to understand the differences in interpretation between the military and the civilian end state and transition criteria. 20 Turning to operational design, current joint doctrine describes operational termination as so critical to success that it is the first thing to be determined when planning an operation. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve advantages is crucial to achieving the strategic end state. 21 According to JP 3- combat and peacetime activities, they lack definable timetables for transferring responsibilities, and are often conducted in a fluid and increasingly political environment", 23 thus codifying in doctrine the difficulty and ambiguity of relief operations.
In any relief effort, the military's role is normally associated with maintaining or restoring essential services and activities to mitigate damage, loss, hardship or suffering. In DSO, long-term relief is primarily a state and local responsibility; for FHA, a national responsibility. FM 3-07 acknowledges that there is no discrete menu of tasks or metrics by which a commander involved in such an operation can use to measure his success; 24 these must be developed on the ground.
In response to an emergency, however, FM 3.07 does focus relief tasks on lifesaving measures to alleviate the immediate needs of a population in crisis, including security and the provision of medical support, food, water, medicines, clothing, blankets and shelter. In some cases it involves transportation support to move affected people from a disaster area to areas with more infrastructure or security. Relief operations also involve the restoration of minimal infrastructure and create the conditions needed for longer-term recovery, and include establishing and maintaining the minimum safe working conditions needed to protect relief workers and the affected population. They may also involve repairing or demolishing damaged structures, restoring or building bridges, roads, and airfields, and removing debris from critical supply routes and relief sites, 25 although unless repairing major structures is essential to life-saving activities (like a destroyed bridge to reconnect a population center with medical facilities), major repair and restoration tasks normally are relegated to the reconstruction phase. In the absence of more concrete guidance, this list could well serve as the baseline for transition tasks. The ultimate aim is to transition relief functions to civilian organizations as rapidly and efficiently as possible.
Policy and Resources
Recognizing the increasing likelihood of troop deployments for humanitarian assistance since the end of the Cold War, both the 1997 President's National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review described military intervention into humanitarian assistance operations as both necessary and expected. 26 In these documents, it is clearly the President's vision that relief operations should be of limited duration and designed to give the local authorities the breathing room and opportunity to put their own house in order as a requirement before withdrawing troops. 27 The office most engaged with foreign relief today is the United States Agency for Immediate response allows on-scene commanders and those ordered to support relief efforts to assist in the rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties, the maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and the safeguarding of public health. Tasks may also include fire fighting, water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel, and the clearance of debris, rubble and explosive ordnance from public facilities to permit rescue or movement of people and restoration of essential services. 38 Among JTF Andrew's primary operational military objectives and challenges was the ability to create the conditions for making the communities an integral part of the recovery process, enabling them; in other words, to facilitate the return to normalcy.
Responding to the commander's intent and key tasks, the rapid initial response of the JTF focused on five critical areas of emergency services: providing food and water, shelter, sanitation, medial supplies and services, and transportation, with the objective of easing the suffering. 39 Essentially deployed to ensure that local residents had access to life-saving measures and means, the JTF provided much-needed relief in these areas, and was generally hailed as a success by both local and state authorities, as well as the media.
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The early establishment of a strong working relationship between the military and the lead federal agency (FEMA) was effected by 2 nd U.S. Army, when they appointed a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to serve as liaison between DOD and FEMA. This officer established contact with FEMA on 23 August -before Andrew made landfalland by the time the JTF was established four days later, many of the requirements were outlined, relationships were built, and much of the structure in place. This early cooperation persisted throughout the mission, and was a force multiplier as the JTF took control. 41 Despite the lack of specific transition criteria, the interface between the JTF staff and FEMA was excellent. This relationship enabled both the military and the civilian authorities to recognize the need for measuring the success of operations; namely, the capacity of state and local governments to shoulder the burden to provide essential public services, specifically sanitation, water, power, and emergency rescue and medical support. 42 Early interface with local and regional officials led to a list of key milestones that both parties agreed to. This enabled the JTF to work towards a civilauthority endorsed list of tasks which, when accomplished, signaled mission complete.
This enabled the JTF to withdraw after approximately 20 days, when the key milestone of 'schools reopened' was met. However, at least one major after action report comment indicated a critical lack of criteria for mission accomplishment at the outset:
"When should forces be released from continuing recovery or reconstitution work?
There is no guidance when the military portion of disaster response should end." 43 While this question was unanswerable at the time of alert, the JTF staff was able to quickly capitalize on frequent and routine interaction with on-scene civilian officials and agree upon transition criteria soon after the JTF arrived. The use of "negotiated conditions" to determine transition milestones, hammered out with the civil authorities, is a technique to consider in the future when the just-alerted commander may only have a writ to provide "immediate response," and little else to go on. Without collaborating and cooperating with governmental officials to jointly determine milestones for transition, clearly-defined and tangible exit metrics will remain elusive. police force failed to show up for work, either because their own homes were devastated, traffic arteries were closed or flooded, or because it was simply too dangerous a place to work in the storm's immediate aftermath. 47 In fact, there are still National Guardsmen today still patrolling some parts of New Orleans, three years after the fact. 48 According to the United States Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) database regarding DoD's Hurricane Katrina response, the overarching purpose established by the president and JTF commanders at all levels was to empower parish (local or county) governments to rebuild their communities -not to do it all for them.
For the JTF, the critical issue was restoring capacity (such as emergency medical services, clean water availability and critical traffic route opening) so the local and state agencies could help themselves. CALL captured that in order to do this, the JTF outlined six key tasks. First, influencing the local government and public service agencies to accept a leading role in the rebuilding efforts; second, influencing the federal government (through FEMA) to target resources towards those parishes most in need; third, to connect local leaders with the resources available to them and assist them establishing relationships with the proper agencies; fourth, influencing media to highlight the plight and rebuilding efforts of these parishes. The fifth key task was to directly assist local populace with short term, high-impact civil-military engineering projects, and finally, to assist local officials in developing a transition plan which allowed for continuing long term solutions. 49 This provides a second model for establishing metrics for transition -that of a set of objective conditions. This set of six tasks provides an excellent alternative model for how to determine transition criteria and glide path during relief operations that has great potential for future use.
These operational tasks were implemented by the JTF and federal entities with varying results initially, based on the workers' understanding, and the different magnitude of damage sustained by different communities. For the most part, the tactical execution of tasks centered around those normally associated with disaster relief: rescue, water and food distribution, sanitation, and emergency shelter, and debris removal. Once these six tasks were adequately addressed, military and civilian officials were able to look ahead to longer term recovery. 50 Situations improved at different rates in different parts of the disaster area. In some areas, as conditions improved in their area of operation, a new dynamic emerged in that troops had to 'wean' the local population, government, and economy from the relief effort's resources. While in most cases the turnover to civilian relief agencies went smoothly, in several areas the actual return to the civilian sector was frequently met with extreme reticence by the local officials and citizens who, after the trauma and aftermath of this catastrophe, did not feel secure in the military's departure. 51 Moreover, in many cases during the Katrina relief efforts, small unit leaders felt significant pressure during the drawdown to continue support due to their direct relationship with the population, despite the need being greater in other areas. 52 In short, the citizenry in several parishes and neighborhoods had lost faith in their local and regional elected officials, and until that was restored, the announcement of the military's impending departure was not happily received. Perhaps a more visible presence by local officialsneighborhood, local, and parish leaders -earlier in the relief operation, coupled with To be sure, the turnover to civilian relief agencies must be collaboratively predetermined, anticipated, briefed, tracked, phased, programmed, and briefed to the public, in conjunction with relief agencies and the local leaders. Resources projected for release in one area might be diverted to more remote or harder hit areas, based on a collaborative relationship among the military, civilian relief, and local officials. This relationship must be established at the earliest opportunity. In the absence of a proactive civil-military relationship, a model such as Objective Criteria served JTF Katrina well. In the wake of a crisis so devastating that the civilian response was slow to realize its enormity, Objective Criteria enabled the JTF to work towards a transition until such time as the local, state, and federal authorities were capable of assuming a more robust role.
Tsunami Relief
At 7:38 am local time, 26 December, 2004, a 9.15-magnitude earthquake struck off the west coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. It was rapidly followed by fifteen smaller earth quakes across the region. Altogether these seismic events lasted for ten minutes and produced several massive tsunamis. The height of the individual tsunamis differed radically from area to area, depending on the direction the shoreline faced and the depths of the surrounding waters. Along the coastlines of Thailand and Sumatra, some waves reached over thirty feet in height, though most were half that height, and many areas received more than one wave. Many people who survived a first wave assumed that the worst had passed, only to be swept away by a second, often larger wave that arrived a few minutes later. By the end of this disaster, over 225,000 people were declared dead or missing, entire towns and villages had totally vanished, and the shorelines of northwestern Indonesia and other affected countries were permanently altered. 53 Within 72 hours of the disaster, the U.S. Navy had established JTF 536 at Utapao, Thailand, 54 and also established three Combined Support Forces (CSFs), one in support of each of the three hardest-hit countries: Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Indonesia.
This heralded the opening of OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. Essentially a naval force from the 7 th Fleet augmented by teams from USAID, and soon joined by Australia, Japan, and Singapore, this force worked to assist the governments of the hardest-hit countries, conducting search and rescue, delivering supplies, and providing medical support. While international relief agencies arrived and supplies began pouring in, other countries provided medical teams and other support. However, when the U.S. offered assistance in the first few days following the tsunami, the Indonesian Government reluctantly accepted that support, but with one major caveat: that U.S. forces would maintain a minimal footprint ashore, and that all U.S. personnel be withdrawn before the first of March. 55 In adhering to this request, the U.S. remained committed for just under two months. USAID advance representatives flowed into the area along with the Navy, and quickly formed civil-military teams with the JTF and the CSFs. 60 Other private organizations, some already in country before the tsunami, greeted the JTF as it closed.
In discussing the end state for operations in the region, more than one recommended During the six weeks of the Navy's involvement, more and more relief organizations, international support, and host country abilities continued to grow. To develop principles to guide the impending transition, the CSG Commander directed the military footprint to slowly shrink when RFAs for military assistance decreased or were passed to aid agencies. 64 To help visualize the glide path towards their own eventual withdrawal, the JTF used four capabilities-based categories of conditions for transition.
The staff was ordered to track the capacity of non-CSF organizations as those organizations expanded their footprint in country and became capable of accomplishing:
Coordination (essentially Command and Control -how capable they were in coordinating continued relief); Health Services (how capable they were in providing disease control measures); Engineering (capacity to provide basic sanitation, water, and engineering support); and Transportation (capacity for water distribution, in-country as well as inter-country delivery of supplies. 65 to ensure the civil-military linkage is strong. It is imperative that a collaborative effort be made to identify the disengagement glide path, as civilian officials and NGOs have differing perspectives as to when they are able to continue relief operations with little or no loss of tempo. Tracking Capacity is a useful way to quantify how capable arriving enablers are, but these must be specific. If too general, they will not convey an accurate picture to the commander.
Admittedly, the most difficult part of any relief operation after defining the mission is defining when to transition to civil authorities. While there are no easy solutions, it is clear that remaining mindful of security issues, restoring essential services, and early collaboration and coordination with civilian agencies are critical to success. Maximizing the expertise of USAID representatives as well as NGOs, local, state, and national officials to develop metrics and milestones, aggressively looking for transition criteria early in the process that can track a glide path to transition, and remaining mindful of the mission to stop the dying and ease the suffering, are perhaps the most important multipliers to employ.
Whether using Objective Criteria, Negotiated Criteria, or RFAs/ Tracking Capacity, at the point of the spear, those with boots on the ground are truly the key to a successful relief effort. Never have those men and women who are on the spear's point
